




Democratization has suddenly become a fashionable theme
in both the practice and the study of European integration.1
Since the Treaty on European Union (TEU) of 1991, which
both raised the profile of the integration process and sub-
stantially extended the scope of powers enjoyed by the
European Union (EU; the Union), the Union has become far
more controversial. Received wisdom dictates that it suf-
fers from a (generally unspecified) ‘democratic deficit’, which
was scarcely noticed beforehand. Paradoxically, however,
in the last decade several attempts to render the EU more
democratic have actually been made, a good example being
the significant empowerment of the European Parliament
(EP). Moreover, the TEU made member-state nationals
EU citizens, an unprecedented step in world history, even
if EU citizenship remains rather limited. Indeed, the EU
is preparing for both further enlargement and the next
round of Treaty reform (due in 2004) by launching a process
of ‘civil dialogue’ and a quasi-constitutional convention.
These are supposed to provide suggestions about increas-
ing the legitimacy and democratic credentials of the Union
system.
This chapter explores the particularities and difficulties
of the EU’s democratization, and argues that the way for-
ward is to construct a set of democratic practices based
on deliberative democracy and active citizenship, cemented
in and reflected by institutional reform. The EU case indi-
cates much of interest to scholars of democratization in
general, as it points towards the need both for innovative
mixtures of experimentation and deliberative democracy
and to re-think the links between the ‘domestic’ and the
THE EUROPEAN UNION 189
‘international’. First, however, it is necessary to examine the
context in which EU democratization must be undertaken.
Framing the issue: EU democracy as a quadruple
balancing act
Democratization of the EU is a very complex and unusual
process. As a transnational system, the Union is unlikely
to be suited to the straightforward application of models
based on the nation-state, requiring instead innovations in
the theory and practice of democratic governance (Schmitter
2000). Additionally, reformers must recognize that the EU
is deeply coloured by a path dependency that affects both
the nature of the EU system and the attitudes of actors
within it about the possibilities for reform. Attempting to
make common policy in the absence of a hegemon, Union
decision-making has always been characterized by the search
for consensus between key actors in the elites at national
and EU levels, even though the elites’ composition has
changed as the inter-institutional balance of power has
evolved. Lord (1998) observes that this ‘extreme consensus
democracy’ has been at the expense of mass democracy,
which explains both how perceptions of a democratic
deficit have arisen and why the EU’s legitimacy crisis of
the last decade surprised many in positions of power. How-
ever, this culture of consensus usefully demonstrates that
the EU must in fact balance different kinds of legitimacy
and the demands of different groups of actors in order to be
democratic. Thus, although the equilibrium between these
different sources and types of legitimacy is clearly in need
of revision, it is necessary to acknowledge that the approach
itself – the instinct for balance – is both a reflection of the
EU’s own political culture and likely to remain necessary.
The first balancing act that the EU must perform is
between different competing national views of what a demo-
cratic Union would constitute. The member states con-
tinue to want different things from integration in terms of
both specific policy areas and its ultimate end-point, the
so-called finalité politique. Consequently they differ in the
degree of sovereignty they are prepared to exercise jointly
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with their partners, and also over the specific regime they
would consider legitimate to erect at EU level. Member
states may agree that a certain policy area should be an EU
competence, but differ enormously about the nature of the
legislation to be made and the constitution of the relevant
decision rules. Furthermore, there are differences in polit-
ical culture that often shape national elite responses to any
given issue, as is demonstrated most notoriously by the
diametrically opposed German and British understandings of
the term ‘federal’ (respectively a decentralized system based
on strict separation of powers and a strong rule of law,
versus a centralized superstate). Moreover, national elite
views about the desirable outcomes of the integration pro-
cess change over time. For example, Italy under Prime Min-
ister Berlusconi appears far less viscerally pro-integration
than formerly. Thus it is clear that this first balance must
be constantly revisited; no particular view has an inherently
superior legitimacy. Each state that joins the Union has
formal equality with all other member states, so there is no
a priori reason why, for example, Denmark’s reluctance to
sign up to the Schengen agreements on freedom of move-
ment is less legitimate than Belgium’s enthusiasm.2
The second balancing act is between the different levels
of governance within the EU system. The Union has not
replaced or superseded national systems, which continue
to reflect different national balances between centre and
periphery and various approaches to the welfare state; rather,
the EU has ‘fused’ with them (Wessels 1997), leaving
(sub)national governments to implement EU policy accord-
ing to national dictates. In for instance Germany, Austria,
Belgium and Spain, regional/local government is powerful,
bolstered by strong normative claims to legitimacy based
on the principle of local self-government, often enshrined
in national constitutions. As a complex and varied system
of multi-level governance the EU needs to reflect the
demands and roles of governance at local/regional, national
and European levels if it is to be legitimate. Moreover,
democratizing the Union cannot be accomplished solely at
EU level, but also requires change at (sub)national level,
given that it is through actors and institutions there that
most citizens will experience the Union as a policy-maker.
The third balancing act is between output legitimacy
and input legitimacy. Traditionally, output legitimacy has
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been preferred, in the hope that loyalties would be trans-
ferred to the Union as a result of its production of public
goods perceived to increase the general welfare. But this
approach has been insufficient for two main reasons. First,
the EU’s inability to develop the necessary redistributive
policy, the member states having refused to give it the
necessary competence and budget (despite the growth in
relative importance of EU cohesion policy). Second, the
Union’s lack of attention to public participation, which has
created, or at best done nothing to remove, a situation in
which citizens are generally alienated from the integration
process (Eurobarometer 54, Autumn 2000).3 Thus democrat-
ization will require a shift in favour of input legitimacy,
which will not be easy in the absence of a Europeanized
civil society (Warleigh 2001). However, without the emerg-
ence of a self-conscious European demos, institutional
change at EU level will not be perceived as legitimate but
rather as the imposition of a false majoritarianism unrooted
in (political) identity (Chryssochoou 2000[1998] ).
The fourth balancing act is between different normative
views of democracy. There are many different views about
how democracy can be possible in the context of the EU,
which may colour the different and changing national elite
positions on the Union’s finalité politique. However, this
issue increasingly goes beyond national cleavages at the
elite level to academic and popular debates on the best way
to develop institutions like EU citizenship or the principles
on which policy in newly-vigorous fields (such as justice
and home affairs, or security and defence) should be based.
In terms of political theory, this boils down to debates over
the most appropriate way to mix principles of cosmopolit-
anism and communitarianism, both of which are relevant
to the Union given its multi-level and ‘fused’ nature.
Particularities and difficulties: democratization in a
quixotic polity4
The novel nature of the EU – its location at an uncer-
tain and fluctuating point on a spectrum between classic
international organization and supranational federation –
means that it has numerous particularities. With regard to
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democratization, the first of these is the need to specify a
suitable comparator for analysis. As the first case of insti-
tutionalized transnational democracy, however flawed, the
EU is a paragon of legitimacy compared with traditional
international diplomacy or international organizations.
National models are unlikely to be suitable as direct com-
parators, given their dependence on a range of features
and structures that the EU does not possess (see Schmitter
2000: 15–19). In addition, unfavourable comparisons with
the nation-states may exhibit an overly rosy view of demo-
cracy in contemporary Western states, ignoring trends like
the shift to the executive and the emergence of a ‘post-
parliamentary’ system.
Given that the Union is developing in terms of its com-
petence, geographical scope, and modes of policy-making, a
further particularity is the requirement to marry democrat-
ization to a system that is rather more obviously evolution-
ary and process-based than those operating in member
states. There is an unusual clarity in the EU case of the need
to be experimental with forms of democratic governance.
Additionally – and partly as a result – the EU’s democrat-
ization process is uncommon in its blunt revelation of the
links between state power and democracy. This can be
seen in the repeated and ongoing attempts to elaborate the
principles of subsidiarity, proportionality and flexibility as
means of marrying national interest with collective need. It
can also be seen in the crude, but nonetheless instructive,
trade-off between different types of sovereignty: ‘national’
sovereignty (understood as the power of national govern-
ments), and ‘popular’ sovereignty (understood as either that
of a nation or of the collectivity of EU citizens).
A further particularity of the EU context is the failure of
most of the concerned actors to appreciate the implications
of the EU’s quixotic nature for models of democratization.
Although other models of reform have been articulated,
most strategies tend to rely to an unhelpful degree on what
can be called the ‘liberal democratic blueprint’ (LDB). This
is not to say that liberal democracy has no virtues which
could be remodelled for the EU; as Lord and Beetham (2001)
point out, certain classic features of liberal democracy are
certainly capable of such adaptation. However, the LDB,
with its emphasis on majoritarian parliamentary systems,
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ultimately provides a zero-sum choice about democratization
as a yes-or-no response to the question whether the EU
should become a federal state. This tends to reduce issues
of democratization to arguments about the desirability or
otherwise of federalism, which tend to be circular and incap-
able of solution. As Schmitter (2000) points out, there is a
danger that citizens: (a) equate democracy as a set of prin-
ciples and practices with one particular (albeit dominant)
democratic tradition, namely liberal democracy; (b) decide
that the EU cannot therefore be democratic on the grounds
of national sovereignty; and (c) decide that the EU is there-
fore at best an undemocratic necessity to be suffered grudg-
ingly, or at worst a system to be rejected in its entirety.
This pre-eminence of the LDB thus in fact creates the
key difficulty of democratization in the EU: the centrality
of the principle of national/state sovereignty in the debate.
Creativity is thereby stifled; moreover, the ‘Europeanization’
of civil society – necessary to create a supportive and re-
sponsive arena for institutional reform (Pérez-Díaz 1998) –
is thereby rendered more difficult. This is because citizens
often simply fail to perceive when they need to engage
with the EU to secure their objectives, as their horizons
remain predominantly national. Moreover, given the pre-
eminence of the LDB ‘frame’, they may consider that such
mobilization is impossible in the EU system. Successful
campaigning activity at EU level by non-governmental
organizations has so far failed to change this situation
(Warleigh 2001). Developing a meaningful set of common
European values and principles requires more than their
proclamation by treaty; without further popular interaction,
citizens will continue to experience those values primarily
as national phenomena.
A further difficulty is the need to address the fact that
EU democratization is part of a general reconfiguring of
the European state. Certain commentators have gone so
far as to say that the integration process actually ‘rescued’
the idea of the nation-state in western Europe by allowing
its successful rearticulation after the Second World War
(Milward 1994[1992] ). Whether or not this is true, it remains
to be seen whether the Union can do as much for the new
nation-states of Central and Eastern Europe as they accede.
Nonetheless, it is clear that the EU is both a response to,
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and a cause of, the changing form of the nation-state in
Europe. It has a similar relationship with the view that the
exercise of sovereignty is often best achieved through its
‘pooling’ – witness the euro currency. However, this means
in turn that democratization of the EU is part of a process
of re-thinking the state itself. This has had two principal
manifestations to date. First, the neoliberal tendency to use
the EU as a means of ‘rolling back the state’ at national
level while failing to reintroduce the same state controls or
functions at EU level. The success of the single European
market and the weakness of Union social policy are illus-
trative. Second, the fact that the EU has opened a Pandora’s
box in terms of centre–periphery contestation, at least in
some parts of some member states. This does not prove
that the EU must always privilege neoliberal tendencies or
lead to a ‘Europe of the regions’. However, it does demon-
strate that the EU’s democratization is all the more diffi-
cult for its impact on intra-, as well as inter-, state relations,
and its use as a means of rethinking what the state can,
or should, do. This means that support for integration can
wax and wane according to current perceptions and com-
parisons with relevant states. As an example, recall the
difficult relationship between the EU and Britain’s political
left. In the 1960s and 1970s, the Union was considered part
of a capitalist project to exploit the working classes; in the
late 1980s, when Jacques Delors led the European Commis-
sion, there was a shift towards seeing it as a potential source
of social democracy; and now, although the mainstream
of the Labour Party remains relatively pro-European, the
EU’s failure to develop its competences in social policy has
triggered a return to Euroscepticism on the left.
The way forward: towards deliberative democracy?
There are of course various positions taken about the way
forward. Communitarians often argue that EU democracy
is a contradiction in terms, given that it depends on the
existence of a demos, which can be found at national but
not ‘European’ level. Others argue in a more cosmopolitan
manner that the way out of the impasse is to apply the
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strictures of Western liberal democracy to the EU, making
it a federation and hoping that the new institutions will
cause demos-formation over time. However, most scholars
are seeking to find a way between these two extremes. For
there is an urgent need for some kind of further demo-
cratization of the Union to protect the benefits to date of
the integration process, yet no great will at elite or popular
levels to turn the EU into a state in its own right (see inter
alia Chryssochoou 2000[1998]; Schmitter 2000).
Many analysts argue that the most suitable way to address
the particularities and difficulties of democratizing the
European Union is to apply a reform model based on deliber-
ative democracy. This is because the principal problem is
the lack of a Europeanized public sphere. That reflects the
lack of a European political identity and solidarity between
member-state nationals, their status as EU citizens having
so far failed to alter significantly their sense of political
identity. At popular and elite levels, there are substantial
differences in perspective about both ‘big picture’ and more
particular policy issues. There is no real sense of com-
munity, or demos (even civically-defined) at the EU level.
Liberal democracy, with its dependence on a tightly-bound
demos and over-reliance upon representative mechanisms
that sit ill in the non-majoritarian EU context, is of limited
help. Instead of implicitly assuming the existence of an
EU political community, reformers must pay attention to
the generation of one. Deliberation is a means by which
this sense of community can be created by a process of
difference management. It is also open-ended and process-
based – which sits well with the evolutionary nature of the
European integration process.
Deliberative democracy argues that the best form of demo-
cratic governance is one in which all those affected by a
public policy engage in a process of deliberation: that is,
they exchange views, try to understand other actors’ needs
and perspectives, and thereby reach a mutually acceptable
outcome (Dryzek 2000). Thus, it is a process of constructing
a common interest by learning and mutual accommoda-
tion. It is not a process of bargaining or interest aggrega-
tion; deliberation envisages the formation of a consensus
through dialogue, not a package deal whereby actors reach
strategic accommodations through processes of log-rolling.
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To facilitate this, deliberative democracy envisages that
issues should be treated in isolation from each other. Thus,
participation is privileged over representation; the franchise
is considered not just the right to vote but rather the ability
to participate effectively in the formation of public policy,
based on principles of pluralism, free debate and mutual
recognition as political equals. Deliberative democracy thus
favours input legitimacy over output legitimacy, and as a
corollary depends on transparency and accountability, so
that those who have engaged in deliberation can ensure
that their input has been reflected in public policy (J. Cohen
1997). As a key asset in this context, deliberative democracy
expects differences to exist, and seeks to provide a mechan-
ism for actors to co-operate and build mutual understanding
despite these differences. It is a means by which community
can be built from the bottom up, and by which socialization
can occur at both popular and elite levels through active
citizenship, iterated contact, and social learning (Christiano
1997).
Further assets of deliberative democracy in the EU con-
text are its adaptability, ability to generate a culture of
voluntary compliance, and correspondence with the EU
culture of informal politics and inter-institutional dialogue
(see Dryzek 2000). Deliberation can be a means of making
decisions in every policy regime, but is capable of providing
different solutions to each issue and involving different
groups of stakeholders as appropriate. This is in keeping
with the EU, whose various competences are subject to dif-
ferent decision rules and involve many different actor sets.
The ability to generate voluntary compliance is a particular
benefit; EU policy depends on the member states (and their
subnational governments and/or agencies) to implement
policy, which leads to many gaps in the implementation
of Union legislation. If legislation came from deliberation
rather than log-rolling, the implementation deficit would
probably diminish. In terms of inter-institutional dialogue,
deliberation is of great relevance. It must be recalled that
EU policy is generated through policy networks, given the
unclear separation of powers and interdependence between
the EU institutions and national equivalents. These net-
works function best when they engender a process of mutual
understanding, such as the growing joint legislative culture
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between the EU Council and the European Parliament (EP)
that is being established as a result of the codecision pro-
cess5 (Shackleton 2000). Such networks can be long-term
or issue-specific. What matters is that they are successful
when marginal utility becomes translated into a process of
mutual understanding and collaboration.
Of course, deliberative democracy is not capable of
application to the EU in unaltered form; like any theory it
must be adapted to the real-world context. First, there is
the obvious issue of communication capacity. Deliberation
is impossible if citizens cannot understand each other. In
the EU there is no popular lingua franca, despite the grow-
ing dominance of English at elite level. This means that at
least in the medium term deliberative democracy will have
to be tempered with representative democracy (Lord and
Beetham 2001), accompanied by creative approaches to the
language issue.
Deliberative democracy is so different from conventional
liberal democratic views that citizens may simply fail to
recognize it as ‘democracy’. Others might find its uses lim-
ited; deliberative democracy is more than capable of recon-
ciling differences of principle rather than policy preference,
but even ‘sincere reasoners (may) . . . find themselves in
principled disagreements’ (Gaus 1997: 231). This means that
arbitration institutions will be necessary; deliberation will
sometimes require some form of political decision-making
institution, to be used sparingly but occupying the apex
of the system. Deliberative democrats often consider that
if no mutual accommodation can be reached the proposal
in question should fall. If this happens regularly, however,
citizens are likely to question the worth of the system, no
matter how greatly they influence it (Gaus 1997). This is
especially problematic for the EU, which does not have great
reserves of legitimacy on which to draw in extremis.
Furthermore, a well-known feature of the EU system is
its ability to produce unanticipated outcomes to policy
decisions through the intervention of opportunistic actors
(Pierson 1996); deliberative democracy would need to
reduce the potential for such outcomes to occur in order
to retain credibility (Lord and Beetham 2001). Moreover,
there are likely to be limits to the amounts of time and
resources individuals are prepared to commit to deliberation:
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‘deliberation fatigue’ is a real possibility if there are no
intermediary or representative mechanisms to channel the
fruits of deliberation into the policy-making process. How-
ever, this should not be taken to mean that uniform solu-
tions to EU problems are always necessary. Deliberation
could be a very useful means of indicating where and how
vague principles like ‘proportionality’ (the idea that the
EU should act only to the minimum extent necessary to
secure an objective), subsidiarity (whereby responsibilities
are allocated to either the (sub)national or the EU level) and
flexibility (the idea that integration need not be uniform
but may instead require differentiated structures and policy
regimes) should be operationalized (see Warleigh 2002).
Thus perhaps the chief virtue of deliberative democracy
here is its reliance upon, and signalling of the need for, a
more participatory political culture. As the EU becomes
much more clearly a process of political unification, the need
for a reform process that draws heavily on active citizenship
is clear if citizens are to be socialized into the EU system
and thereby enable it to develop in ways they consider
legitimate. The recent process of civil dialogue and the ‘con-
stitutional convention’ hold some promise in this regard.6
Conclusion: drawing lessons in democratization
from the EU
The main lessons about democratization from the EU case
should not be considered as a prescription automatically to
be applied in other cases, but more a broad-brush indication.
The initial lesson is that EU democratization must
produce a substantive rather than a Schumpeterian form of
democratic governance. Institutional aspects of democrat-
ization, while certainly in need of further attention, are
merely part of the complex problematic; indeed, a rather
greater part is the absence of a Europeanized civil society.
Without this, democratization will be impossible, for the
existence of a public sphere is what makes it possible for
institutional reform processes to deepen and resonate with
the citizens subject to it (Pérez-Díaz 1998). However, in the
EU’s case this represents a particular challenge: civil society
THE EUROPEAN UNION 199
must ‘Europeanize’ (i.e. take on a specific EU rather than
narrowly national element) in a context of a sustained
legitimacy crisis and evidence of popular disaffection.
The second lesson is that deliberative democracy has a
vital role to play in aiding this process of democratization-
via-civil-society-Europeanization. Deliberative democracy
places its emphasis on participation and input legitimacy.
This is precisely the prescription needed by the contem-
porary EU, even if the nature of the Union as a polity places
limits on the extent to which ‘pure’ deliberative democracy
can be applied. Democratizing the EU requires the success-
ful execution of a quadruple balancing act in which various
sets of interests are entered into a process of dialogue and
equilibrium generation. This should be conceived as a pro-
cess that requires experimentation and creativity. The EU
is an evolving polity, whose final contours are not yet clear
and which appears to be subject to increasing differentia-
tion in terms of its policy regimes and decision-making
modes, as well as both its member states and their nation-
als. The struggle to democratize the EU is thus likely to be
ongoing, perhaps requiring application of the deliberative
method in different ways in order to reflect the changing
status and composition of the Union and its citizenry.
The third lesson follows logically: it speaks to the need
to reconsider the links between the ‘domestic’ and the
‘international’. The EU is a particularly ‘deep’ form of
regional integration. As such it reflects with great clarity
a more general trend in contemporary politics, in which,
thanks to globalization and interdependence, it is difficult
to separate issues of domestic democratization from others
like ‘global justice’ or ‘ethical foreign policy’. In EU mem-
ber states, national reform is restricted to some extent by
EU norms such as the (albeit challenged) primacy of EU law.
For the EU as a whole, democratization involves issues of
political identity construction. These offer a laboratory for
the study of how different communities can become part of
a collective political culture.
Finally, and optimistically, the EU case suggests that
democratization is a difficult, rather than an impossible,
project. The Union has by no means succeeded in meeting
all the challenges posed by its ‘democratic deficit’. However,
the latter crisis has acted as a catalyst for thought about
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why democracy matters, and how it can best be reconfigured,
in the EU. This thought increasingly points towards the
need for creative solutions and the adaptation of existing
theories and practices of democracy to a contemporary con-
text characterized by increased societal pluralism and a more
diffuse system for the exercise of public power. Innovation
is the key to democratization of the European Union. So
perhaps the main lesson to be drawn here is that democr-
atization is possible, but only if we are prepared to think
‘outside the box’.
Notes
1 EU studies have taken a ‘normative turn’ in recent years. This is, first,
a response to the perceived democratic deficit and the official attention
that has begun to receive. Secondly, it reflects trends within EU integra-
tion theory, which has been going through a period of revision and
reflexive thought combining normative with meta-theoretical issues.
Thirdly, it follows increased interest from scholars outside the interna-
tional relations and political science traditions, alerted by the Treaty on
European Union to the EU as a polity-in-the-making and investigating it
as a novel site of democratization.
2 These agreements were made on an extra-treaty basis in 1985, and
incorporated into EU law by the Treaty of Amsterdam (agreed 1997;
ratified 1999).
3 Eurobarometer under the aegis of the European Commission regularly
samples citizens’ opinions from all member states.
4 Some of these particularities are described as part of the ‘quadruple
balancing act’ and are thus not revisited here.
5 Codecision is one of the three principal legislative procedures of the EU,
which vary in the degree of power granted to the EP. Codecision gives
the EP the right to both amend and veto legislation, making it the
legislative equal of the EU Council.
6 The Convention on the Future of Europe was established in September
2001 by the EU member states’ heads of government. The members of
the Convention represented the member states’ heads of government,
but also the various national parliaments, the European Parliament and
the European Commission. Their task was to deliberate on four specific
issues (the separation of powers between the EU and national levels; the
simplification of the various EU treaties; the status of the Charter of
Fundamental Rights, which had been ‘attached’ to the Treaties by the
Nice Treaty of 2001; and the role of national parliaments in the EU
system). To that end, the Convention produced a Draft Constitution for
the EU, on which the subsequent round of EU Treaty Reform (to take
place in late 2003–early 2004) is based.
